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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT P. WOOLLEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent
Case No.
8046

vs.

MILTON S. WYCOFF,
Defendant and Appellant

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Appellant (defendant) sets forth a statement of
facts construed most favorably to himself and in conflict with evidence upon which the trial court found
in favor of Respondent (plaintiff). However, it appears that the only question upon which Appellant
relies on appeal is one of law and does not depend for
solution upon the questioned statement of facts. AcSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cordingly, although Respondent does not wholly
agreP with Appellant's Statement of Facts, RespondPUt will set forth only the basic facts as they were
found by the trial court in order to point up the law
problem which is here presented.
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent brought suit and recovered a judgment in the trial court for commissions earned by him
as a licensed real estate broker in procuring a tenant
for certain of appellant's property pursuant to an employment agreement between the parties. (R. 166,
169)
On or prior to August 1, 1951, Appellant had
entered into negotiations with Bessie E. Friedman and
Western Salvage Co. for the purchase of certain
real estate at 1550 South Second West Street in Salt
Lake City. Shortly thereafter Appellant invited Mr.
Robert P. Woolley, known by him to be a licensed
real estate broker, to his office and advised him that
he, Appellant, had an option on the property in question, and then and there orally employed Mr. Woolley to secure a tenant who would be willing to lease
a specified portion of the property for a period of 10
years at a rental of $400 per month. Appellant agreed
with Respondent that in consideration for procuring
such a tenant he would pay Respondent the usual
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and customary real estate commission then prevailing in Salt Lake City for such services. (Tr. 26, 27.)
Mr. Woolley went to work and subsequently
located a willing tenant, a Mr. A. A. Easton, who
was ready, willing and able to enter into the proposed
lease on defendant's terms and who so stated to defendant. Thereafter, upon Defendant's assurance that
the lease was being drawn by his attorney, Mr.
Easton moved an entire gun manufacturing plant
from Trinidad, Colorado, into the leased premises.
(Tr. 34, 35, 36, 37, 38.) Thereafter defendant refused
to exercise his option, left Mr. Easton in the premises
without an enforceable lease, and refused to pay Mr.
Woolley for his services.
Evidence duly adduced showed that the usual
and customary as well as the fair and reasonable
broker's commission then prevailing in Salt Lake City
for procuring a tenant to lease premises was five per
cent of the agreed rental for the first five years of the
lease, and three percent thereof for the next five
years. (Tr. 48-50.)
The court found in favor of the plaintiff and allowed him the commission agreed upon for procuring
a tenant ready willing and able to enter into a lease
with the landlord on his terms.
Defendant asserted the Statute of Frauds as an
additional defense, specifying in particular Sees. 33Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5-1, 3 ~-5-3, and 33-5-4, U .C.A. 1943, now Sections 25S-1, 2S-5-3, 25-5-4, U.C.A. 1953. It is this question of
the Statute of Frauds upon which the present appeal
solely rPsts.

STATEMENT OF POINTS

Point I.
An Agreement of Employment of a Real Estate
Broker to procure a tenant is not an "Agreement Employing an Agent or Broker to purchase or sell Real Estate,"
for the reason that such employment involves only
Personal Property, rather than "Real Estate" as that
term is used in the Statute of Frauds.

Point II.
An Agreement of Employment of a Real Estate
Broker to procure a tenant is not an "Agreement Employing an Agent or Broker to purchase or sell Real Estate,"
for the reason that such employment does not involve
either a purchase or a sale but merely the procuring of
a person willing to enter into a further agreement to use
and possess property title to which remains with the
owner.
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Point I.
An Agreement of Employment of a Real Estate
Broker to procure a tenant is not an "Agreement Employing an Agent or Broker to purchase or sell Real Estate,"
for the reason that such employment involves only
Personal Property, rather than "Real Estate" as that
tenn is used in the Statute of Frauds.

Although appellant asserted several possible sections of the Statute of Frauds upon which he relied in
the trial court, he now premises his argument solely
upon Sec. 25-5-4, which is as follows:
"In the following cases every agreement
shall be void unless such agreement, or some
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:

***
~' ( 5) Every agreement authorizing or
employing an agent or broker to purchase or
sell real estate for compensation." (Emphasis
added.)

Appellant having limited his contention to this
one sub-section, no purpose would be served in arguing the inapplicability of the other sections relied on
at trial.
·
Appellant contends that but one question is involved in this appeal: "Does the term 'real estate'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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contained in the Statute of Frauds, Sec. 25-5-4, Include a ten-year lease?"
l"he problem involved is thus stated too narrowly
and overlooks one of Respondent's major arguments.
There are two questions involved:·
( 1 ) Does this arrangement relate to "real
estate" within the meaning of Sec. 25-5-4 ( 5) ?
(2) Does this arrangement constitute employment to "purchase or sell" within the meaning of
Sec. 25-5-4 ( 5)?
The transaction here involved does not relate to
nor involve "real estate" as that term is used in Subdivision ( 5) of Sec. 25-5-4, of the Statute of Frauds.
It is generally held by the cases that under a
statute such as ours, the term "real estate" does not
include within its purview a "lease" of property.
Washington has a statute of frauds substantially
identical with our Utah law. Sec. 5825 Rem. Comp.
Stat. provides:
"An agreement authorizing or employing
an agent or broker to sell or purchase real
estate for compensation or a commission shall
be void, unless the agreement or some note or
memorandum be in writing.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This statute caine before the Supreme Court of
Washington for co11struction in the case of Myers v.
A.rthur, 135 Wash. 583, 238 P. 899, and with respect
to it the Court said:
"Undoubtedly at common law a leasehold,
whatever its duration in years, was personal
property. The rule, as stated in 35 R.C.L. 970,
supported by abundance of cases, is:
'Except in so far as the common-law
rules may have been modified by statute,
terms for years, however long, are chattels real, falling within the classification
of personal property and governed by the
rules of law applicable to other kinds of
personal property.'

" ... the statute applicable to the present
case says only 'real estate', and does not include the words 'interest in real estate.' And,
as stated in American Savings Bank and Trust
Co., v. Mafridge, supra, an assignment of a
lease for a term of years was not required to
be acknowledged, because we had no statute
providing for it, so here it cannot be held that
an agreement employing an agent or broker
to sell or purchase a lease of real property for
a term of years must be in writing, because we
have no statute requiring it. The statute invoked by the appellant relates to no kind of
property other than real estate." (Emphasis
added)
The Washington Court, thereafter, in the case of
Johnson v. Rutherford, (1948), 200 P. 2d 977,
squarely affirmed this same proposition in a case in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which it held that a leasehold interest in a tavern
premises was not "real estate" within the statute
requiring agreements employing a broker to sell real
estate to be in writing.
In the case of 0' Neill v. Wall, 103 Mont. 388, 62
P. 2d 672, the Supreme Court of Montana had before
it a problem stated as follows:
''The question is thus presented, Is a contract employing a broker or agent to induce
others to enter into an option or lease, or a
lease and option, required by the statute to be
in writing."
After citing and considering va;rious authorities
on the subject, the Court concluded:
"Thus it appears that a lease is not real
estate, and accordingly a broker's contract to
procure or sell a lease is not within the statute
and need not be in writing."
In the case of Dabney v. Edwards, 5 Cal. 2d 1, 53
P. 2d 962, the California Court went into the question
of what does and what does not constitute real estate,
in a case involving an oral contract to sell oil leases.
The statute involved was as follows:
". . . an agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell
real estate for compensation or a commission
is invalid, unless the same or some note or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by his
agent ... "
The Court held that a lease for a period of ten
years was personal property and not real estate within the meaning of the statute.
In the case of Guy v. Brennan, 60 Cal. App. 452,
213 P. 265, an earlier case involving the same statute
the Court said:
"Appellants' second point is that the contract of employment, which was oral, was invalid under that provision of our statute of
frauds which provides that an agreement employing an agent or broker to sell 'real estate'
for compensation or commission is invalid unless the same or some note or memorandum
thereof be in writing and subscribed by the
party to be charged, or by his agent ... "

***
". . . a lease for years, though a chattel
real, is personal property, and therefore,
though it may be an estate or interest in real
property, its is not such an estate or interest
as is connoted by the words 'real estate' ".
For another similar holding see the case of Linde
v. Huene, 205 Cal. 569, 271 P. 1087, wherein the
plaintiff sued to recover compensation u.nder an oral
contract to procure a tenant for an apartment building. The Court in ruling favorably to the plaintiff
said:Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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"
. The contract for their employment
or compensation was not required to be in writing by the terms of subdivision 6 .of Section
1624, Civil Code, which applies only to agreements authorizing or employing an agent or
broker to purchase or sell real estate."
For similar holdings, see: Spalding v. Bennett,
93 Cal. App. 577, 269 P. 948; Albertson v. Warner, 60
Cal. App. 2d 595, 141 P. 2d 246; and Barr v. Campbell
Mill Co., 154 Wash. 83, 280 P. 929.
An annotation at 103 ALR 833 which collects
the cases ·on the subject, states the rule to be:
"Where . . . the statute applies only to
'real estate', it is generally held that it does not
cover leases for a definite term of years."
The argument which Appellant makes for applicability of the Statute of Frauds to the present
situation, is based upon Sec. 68-3-12 (10) U.C.A. 1953,
wherein certain terms are defined as follows:
"In the construction of these statutes the
following rules shall be observed, unless such
construction would be inconsistent with the
manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant
to the context of the statute.
.,

( 10). The terms 'land' 'real estate' and
'real property include land, tenements, hereditaments, water, rights, possessory rights and
claims."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is submitted that the general construction
statute is here totally and completely inapplicable by
its own terms. The statute is to be used only as an aid
to construction when its use would not be inconsistent
with the manifest intention of the legislature and
when it would not be repugnant to the context of the
statute. In the present instance to use the general
statute to define terms of art used in a special statute
would be both inconsistent with the manifest intention of the Legislature and repugnant to the clear
meaning of the statute.
Observe the development of the various sections
of the Statute of Frauds, with relation to real property. And observe their interrelation with each other
and their physical position or context in relation to
each other in the statutes.
Section 25-5-1, U.C.A. 1953, recites that:
"No estate or interest in real property,
other than a lease for a term not exceeding one
year . . . shall be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered or declared otherwise than by
operation of law, or by deeds or conveyance
in writing subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring
the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized by writing." (Emphasis added)
The Legislative history of this section dates back
to Comp. L. 1876, Sec. 1010.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Sec. 25-5-3, U .C.A. 1953, recites:
"Every contract for the leasing for a
longer period than one year, or for the sale of
any lan~s or any interest in lands, shall be
void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by
the party by whom the lease or sale is to be
made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing." (Emphasis added)
This section so far as it relates to "lands or any
interests in lands' is identical with Sec. 3918 (5) 2
Comp. L. 1888.
The next Section in the series is Sec. 25-5-4 ( 5),
U.C.A. 1953, which provides:
"In the following cases every agreement
shall be void unless such agreement or some
note or memorandum thereof is in writing
subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:
( 5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase· or sell
real estate for compensation."
In 1909, when subdivision ( 5) of Sec. 25-5-4,
was added, therefore, the Legislature had before it
two divisions of the Statute which had been in existence for many years, and in which the Legislature
had,, in that chapter, specifically indicated the inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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stances in which it wanted "interests in lands" or "interests in real property" to be controlled by those
statutes in addition to the "land" or "real property"
itself.
With this legislative background it is unmistakably clear that when the Legislature, enlarged the
scope of the statutes dealing with real property, as it
did in 1909, and specifically excluded reference to
"interests in real property," therefrom, it intended
that "interests in real property" should not be included within this section. Elimination of the additional language "interests in real property," from
Subdivision ( 5), when "interests in real estate" were
included in the other sections, would appear to be
conclusive of the question of what the Legislature
meant and of immeasurably greater help in determining what was meant by particular words, than
a general statute, enacted without particular reference to any subject. The context is'clear, both in the
statute itself, and in its juxtaposition with the other
statutes relating to real property, and to ascribe to
the words "real estate" a meaning which would
broaden it far beyond its ordinary and accepted meaning as a term of art would be repugnant to the clear
intent of the Legislature.
Beyond the foregoing considerations, to affix to
subdivision (5) the expanded meaning which appel-:lant suggests 'would be to create the anomalous situaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion where a ~ease for a tern1 of one year or less would
be specifically excluded from operation of the other
sections of the Statute, (Sec. 25-4-1 and 3) and yet
an agent or broker would be precluded from recovering on a contract to procure a tenant to enter into
such a lease. To give the term "real estate" the expanded meaning which appellants seek to ascribe to
it, would be to hold that this anomalous and inconsistent result is what the Legislature intended in
enacting Sec. 25-5-4 ( 5). See Guy v. Brennan, 60
Cal. App. 452, 213 P. 265.
Yet another reason exists why the general statute
(Sec. 68-3-12 ( 10), should not be applied to expand
the meaning of the term of art "real estate" in this
instance.
Subsection 9 of the same Section provides:
" ( 9) The word "property" includes both
real and personal property."
Subsection ( 11) provides as follows:
" ( 11) The term 'personal property' includes every description of money, goods, chattels, effects, evidences of rights in action, and
all written instruments by which any pecuniary obligation, right or title to property is
created, acknowledged, transferred, increased,
defeated, discharged or diminished, and every
right or interest therein. (Emphasis added)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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If these sections are thus read together, it is
apparent that the lease here involved is by definition
equally as much "personal property" under these
sections as it could possibly be "real estate" by
application of Section ( 10).
Point II.
An agreement of Employment of a Real Estate
Broker to procure a tenant is not an "Agreement Employing an Agent or Broker to purchase or sell Real Estate,"
for the reason that such employment does not involve
either a purchase or a sale but merely the procuring of a
person willing to enter into a further agreement to use
and possess property, title to which remains with the
owner.

Respondent takes the position that regardless of
the holding of this Court with respect to a determination of whether or not a lease would or would not be
"real estate" within the meaning of Sec. 25-5-4 ( 5),
. in any event the language "purchase or sale" cannot be expanded properly or legally to include a
contract to obtain a tenant who is willing thereafter
to enter into a mere lease with the owner.
This proposition has been specifically passed
upon in the case of Klie v. Hollstein, 98 N.J.L. 473,
120 A. 16, wherein a broker brought suit for commission for procurement of a lessee for a factory property from the defendant. The Statute of Frauds
provided:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"~No

broker or real estate agent selling or
exchanging land for or on account of the owner shall be entitled to any commission for the
sale or exchange of any real estate, unless the
authority for selling or exchanging such land
is in writing and signed by the owner or hi~
authorized agent."
The Court said:
"Now the contract in suit is not one to pay
commission for "selling or exchanging land,"
On the contrary, it is an agreement to pay the
plaintiff for procuring a lessee for defendant's
real P.state. . . Such agreement is not within
the statute of frauds and hence is not required
to be in writing.''
Again, in Miller Co. v. Woolsey, (N.J.) 128 A.
540, the Court said:
"The statute of frauds requiring that the
authority for selling or exchanging lands be
in writing has no application to a contract for
compensation for procuring a lease."
And in Burt v. Brownstone Realty Co. (N.J.) 112
A. 883, the Court said:
" ... the argument under this point is predicated upon the assumption that the agreement under consideration is a contract between an owner and a broker and within Sec.
10 of the statute of frauds; but, as we have
already intimated, we do not take this view.
It is not an agreement to pay 2% on the purchase price for the services of a broker in effecting a sale; on the contrary, it is an agreeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment to compensate the real estate agent for
negotiating a lease and endeavoring to collect
the rent as it falls due; . . . This makes the
instrument as between the parties merely a
contract at common law to pay certain sums
of money in consideration of certain specified
services, not including the effecting of a sale . . ''
(Emphasis added.)
So, in the present case, all the contract embraced
was that Mr. Woolley, would render services in
locating a tenant who would be willing to contract
with the defendant as the continuing owner of the
land.
The cases are numerous which indicate in all
fields of legislation that leasing has been distinguished from purchasing or selling real estate.

In Gulf Refining Co. v. Glassell, 186 La. 190, 171
So. 846, the Court noted that the distinction between
a sale of real estate and a lease of real estate lay in
the fact that sales · of property include both title
and right to possession and is fundamentally different
from a lease which grants only the use and enjoyment of the thing leased.
A long term lease with the payment of an annual rent has been held not a sale, which is a grant
of ownership, in the case of Chicago Aud. Assoc. v.
Cramer, 8 F. 2d 998.
For other cases with similar holdings distinguishSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing a lease from a sale see the following: Lundberg
v. Bennett, 117 Neb. 66, 219 N.W. 851; Logan v. State
Gravel Co., 158 ~a. 105, 103 So. 526; State vs. Evans,
99 Minn. 220, 108 N. W. 958.
Further support for the proposition that obtaining a tenant is not a purchase or sale is to' be found
in the following cases:
In Lind vs. Huene, (Calif.) 271 P. 1087, there
was involved a claim by a broker for commissions
under an oral contract to secure a lessee. The Court
in reviewing the application of Sec. 1624 (6) of the
California Code said:
". . . In the instant case the brokers were
not authorized to sell or exchange the property,
but only to procure a lessee. The contract for
their employment or compensation was not
required to be in writing by the terms of subdivision 6 of section 1624, Civil Code, which
applies only to agreements authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or
sell real estate."
And in Spalding v. Bennett, 93 Cal. App. 577,269
P. 948, where there was an oral agreement to pay a
specified sum for procuring a lessee the Court said:
"The transaction is not within the provisions of the statute of frauds, since it was
neither an agreement to purchase nor sell real
estate, which in the absence of a memorandum
in writing is prohibited by section 1624 of the
Civil Code and Section 19 7 3 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
SUMMARY

This Court has heretofore in the matter of Case
v. Ralph, 56 Utah 243, 188 P. 640, extended the
language of Sec. 25-5-4 ( 5) to cover the employment
of a broker to procure a purchaser of real estate, as
distinguished from the employment of a broker to
himself directly purchase or sell real estate.
What Appellant now asks the Court to do is to
make three further extensions of the language of this
Section by construction, as follows:
1. To extend the term ''real estate'' to cover
mere personal property and possessory interests notwithstanding the language of the statute does not
contain the term "interest in real estate."
2. To extend the term "purchase or sell" to
cover the mere employment of a broker to procure
a person willing to buy or sell a leasehold interest as
distinguished from purchasing or selling the interest
in the name of the broker. (This would amount to
an extension of the doctrine of Case v. Ralph to a
situation not here directly involved but necessarily
included by implication, to-wit, a situation where
the land owner either owns an existing lease which
he desires to sell, or is aware of an existing lease
which he desires to purchase and acquire by assignment.)
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3. To extend the term "purchase or sell'" to
cover the mere employment of a broker to procure
a person not merely willing to buy or sell an existing
lease or leasehold interest, but willing initially to
enter into a new lease as tenant from the owner-a
transaction which is entirely separate and distinguishable from a purchase or a sale and never partakes of or results in a buy or sell transaction either
by the broker or by the owner.
Plain every-day language such as "real estate"
and "purchase or sell" does not properly or legally
lend itself to such judicial legislation as would be
required to embrace within the meaning of the
statute the three separate extensions here suggested
to the Court. Clear and unambiguous language
would thus be distorted far beyond its normal and
accepted meaning.
Perhaps the situation is best summarized by a
quotation from a book review written by Professor
Arthur L. Corbin, Townsend Professor of Law, Emeritus, of Yale Law School, appearing in the June, 1953,
number of the Yale Law Journal:
"Ancient statutes can be wholly forgotten,
or substantially emasculated by judicial and
administrative action. The Statute of Frauds,
enacted by Parliament in 1677 and re-enacted
in substance by all of the United States, has
been subjected to so many thousands of variable and inconsistent judicial interpretations
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and applications that a court now looks to the
current of decisions rather than to the Statute.
If these decisions have, as many competent
critics believe, turned the Statute into an instrument for the encouragement of repudiation
instead of the prevention of fraud and perjury,
is it not time to look back to the \vords of the
Statute itself rather than to the aberrant applications?"
Respectfully submitted,

OWEN & WARD
DEAN W. SHEFFIELD

Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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